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Abstract
Although choice experiments (CEs) are widely applied in economics to study
choice behaviour, understanding of how individuals process attribute informa-
tion remains limited. We show how eye‐tracking methods can provide insight
into how decisions are made. Participants completed a CE, while their eye
movements were recorded. Results show that although the information pre-
sented guided participants' decisions, there were also several processing biases
at work. Evidence was found of (a) top‐to‐bottom, (b) left‐to‐right, and (c)
first‐to‐last order biases. Experimental factors—whether attributes are defined
as “best” or “worst,” choice task complexity, and attribute ordering—also
influence information processing. How individuals visually process attribute
information was shown to be related to their choices. Implications for the
design and analysis of CEs and future research are discussed. Q5
KEYWORDS
choice experiments, choices, eye tracking, information processing Q4
1 | INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of choice experiments (CEs) to value non‐marketed commodities (Clark,
Determann, Petrou, Moro, & de Bekker‐Grob, 2014; de Bekker‐Grob, Ryan, & Gerard, 2012). Modelling CE responses
typically rests on the assumption of utility maximisation (Manski, 1977). However, it is well documented in the
decision‐making literature that humans deviate from such choice behaviour. Decision‐making has been shown to be
affected by factors such as number of alternatives, number of attributes, time pressure, and similarity between alterna-
tives, as well as the decision environment and person characteristics (Day et al., 2012; Day & Pinto Prades, 2010;
DeShazo & Fermo, 2002; Gigerenzer & Todd, 2001). For example, studies asking participants to verbally express their
reasoning processes while making decisions demonstrate that individuals behave as “cognitive misers,” adapting effort
invested in making a decision to context and resources (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Shugan, 1980).
Methods to investigate how participants make multi‐attribute choices in applied economics are limited. Early research
tested for lexicographic preferences (e.g., do respondents always choose the cheapest option?; McIntosh & Ryan, 2002;
Rosenberger, Peterson, Clarke, & Brown, 2003; Saelensminde, 2006). However, lexicographic preference structures may
be consistent with trading, indicating strong preferences rather than violation of the continuity axiom. Research then tried
a range of other approaches. For example, Ryan et al. (2009) attempted to probe into underlying decision processes by using
“think aloud”methods where participants are asked to vocalise their ongoing decision processes. While finding evidence
that “irrational” responses can be rationalised, respondents struggled to think aloud. Another strategy involves determin-
ing what makes people ignore information (attribute non‐attendance [ANA]), either by asking participants to state which
attributes they consider when making their choices ( Q6Hole, Kolstad, & Gyrd‐Hansen, 2013; Scarpa, Zanoli, Bruschi, &
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Naspetti, 2013), or by inferring ANA from their choices (Campbell, Hensher, & Scarpa, 2011; Hole, 2011;McNair, Hensher,
& Bennett, 2012). However, these two approaches suffer from limitations. Although the stated ANA approach is limited by
participants' ability to recall how they reached their decisions (or to critically reflect on how they make their decisions),
inferred ANA relies on questionable statistical considerations and provides no understanding of why an attribute is
ignored (Hensher, Collins, & Greene, 2013; Hess, Stathopoulos, Campbell, O'Neill, & Caussade, 2013).
Recently, it has been suggested that eye tracking may provide a powerful tool for better understanding economic
behaviour (Lahey & Oxley, 2016). A limited but growing number of studies have explored the role of visual attention
in economic decision‐making (Caplin & Dean, 2008; Knoepfle, Wang, & Camerer, 2009; Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, &
Rangel, 2011; Wang, Spezio, & Camerer, 2010). In the CE literature, a small number of studies have used eye tracking
to improve the modelling of responses, with a focus on ANA (Balcombe, Fraser, & McSorley, 2015; Krucien, Ryan, &
Hermens, 2017; Meibner, Musalem, & Huber, 2016; Spinks & Mortimer, 2015; Uggeldahl, Jacobsen, Lundhede, & Olsen,
2016 Q7; Van Loo et al., 2015). Our novel work extends this literature, exploring how eye tracking can be used to better
understand how respondents interact with the choice tasks and process multi‐attribute information in CEs.
Section 2 describes the design of the experiment, whereas Sections 3 and 4 describe how we link eye movements to
choice processes, using fixation times (FTs; the total time spent on a piece of information; Section 3) and fixation
transitions (how often the eye shifts from one piece of information to another; Section 4). Section 5 investigates the link
between eye movements and choice behaviour. Across all analyses, we consistently find that information processing is
subject to biases (in the order in which information is processed) and experimental factors (whether attributes defined
as best or worse, difficulty of task, and order of attributes). We also demonstrate that choices can be better modelled
when eye‐tracking data are incorporated, meaning that eye movement information explains people's choices beyond
what information is presented to the participants. The results have important implications for the design and analysis
of CEs, which will be discussed. Section 6 discusses limitations of our study, identifying important areas for future
research. Section 7 offers concluding comments.
2 | DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
2.1 | Choice experiment
Participants' choices were recorded for an existing CE on preferences for health and lifestyle programmes to reduce obesity
(Ryan et al., 2015). Each programme was described by seven attributes (Table T11). Participants were presented with 14
choice tasks: two warm‐up (non‐experiment) tasks (#1 and #2) and 10 experimental tasks intermixed with a monotonicity
and stability check. The warm‐up tasks, used to familiarise participants with the format of the choice tasks, were dropped
for the eye‐tracking analyses. Participants were asked to select their preferred option among two generic health and
lifestyle programmes (i.e., Programme A vs. B) and an opt‐out (“Current situation”) option (Figure F11). The order of the
tasks was randomised across participants. Choice tasks were presented on a computer screen. No time limit was imposed.
2.2 | Experimental manipulation
Participants were allocated to one of two experimental conditions. In the initial experiment (Experiment 1, N = 28),
attributes were presented (from top to bottom) in the following order: PROGRAMME, WEIGHT, GOAL, DIABETES,
HBP, TIME, and COST. In the second experiment (Experiment 2, N = 30), the order of the attributes was reversed (i.
e., COST; TIME; …; WEIGHT; PROGRAMME), and the location of the choices was switched (Left ↔ Right). The
experiments were otherwise identical.
2.3 | Eye tracking
The CE was completed in a dedicated eye‐tracking laboratory, and eye movements were recorded using an eye‐tracker
(EyeLink 1000, SR Research). The eye‐tracker was calibrated for each participant using the system's default nine‐point
procedure. To avoid large head movements, we used a combined head‐and‐chin rest. The data were divided into fixations
(i.e., periods where the eyes remain relatively still) and saccades (i.e., fast eyes' movements during which information
processing is suppressed). In line with the eye movement literature, we assume that information extraction only took
place during the fixations and that a minimum of 50 ms was needed for meaningful extraction of information (Tatler,
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Baddeley, & Vincent, 2006). Fixations were analysed in terms of where they were directed to with respect to 24 regions of
interest (ROI; Figure 1).
The initial dataset included 37,784 fixations, recorded from 58 participants responding to 12 choices. After
excluding fixations of less than 50 ms, 36,862 fixations remained: fixations on the column labels (4.6%); fixations on
the multi‐attribute content of the two options (84.7%); fixations on the descriptive column (7.6%); and fixations on
blank space (3.1%). We further excluded fixations on column labels and blank space, resulting in 34,023 observations
for analysis.
FIGURE 1 Illustration of the choice tasks and regions of interest mapping. Dash squares indicate the regions of interest and were not
showed to the subjects during the experiment [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
C
olour
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TABLE 1 Attributes and levels used to define the health and lifestyle programmes
Programme
attributesa
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Codingc Expected
effectd[WORSTb] [INTERMEDIATEb] [BESTb]
Comprehensiveness
[PROGRAMME]
Partial (healthy eating
OR physical activity,
with/without support
for management of
weight changes)
— — Full (healthy eating AND physical activity,
with/without support for management of
weight changes)
Dummy
(ref:
partial)
≥0
Goal [GOAL] Partial (feeling better
OR looking better)
— — Full (feeling better AND looking better) Dummy
(ref:
partial)
≥0
Weight reduction
[WEIGHT]
0 stone 0.5 stone 1 stone 1.5 stones Continuous ≥0
Reduction in risk
of diabetes
[DIABETES]
0% Up to 20% 20–40% 40–60% Continuous
(0; 20; 40;
60)
≥0
Reduction in risk of
high blood
pressure [HBP]
0% Up to 25% 25–50% 50–75% Continuous
(0; 25; 50;
75)
≥0
Time per day
[TIME]
120 min 90 min 60 min 30 min Continuous ≤0
Cost per week
[COST]
£20 £10 £5 £1 Continuous ≤0
aAttributes are listed by order of appearance in the choice options (i.e., PROGRAMME was located at the top of the options).
bWORST/INTERMEDIATE/BEST indicate whether the attribute level was set at its worst/intermediate/best theoretical value (given expected preferences).
cCODING indicates how the attributes were included in the modelling of participants' choices.
dEXPECTED EFFECT refers to the average preferences for the attribute.
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2.4 | Participants
The 58 participants were students or former students from the University of Aberdeen (United Kingdom) recruited using
online advertisement on a first come, first served basis. They took part in return for course credit or participated without
reimbursement. The first 28 participants were allocated to Experiment 1 and the following 30 participants to Experiment
2. The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
The two samples did not differ in terms of socio‐demographic characteristics. Male participants made up 52% of the
sample (13/25) in Experiment 1 and 31% (9/29) in Experiment 2 (χ2 = 1.653; p = .198). Information about height and
weights was used to compute the body mass index—72% (18/25) of participants had a normal body mass index in
Experiment 1 versus 69% in Experiment 2 (20/29; χ2 < 0.001; p > .999). The two samples were also similar in terms of
age, with a mean age of 20.83 (SD= 1.73) and 20.48 (SD = 2.33) for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively (t= 0.614; p = .542).
3 | DETERMINANTS OF FIXATION TIMES
A range of measures has been developed to analyse visual attention (e.g., FT, fixation frequency/count, and pupil
dilation; Duchowski, 2007; Holmqvist, 2011). We focus on the total FT on each ROI, previously used as a measure of
information interest and difficulty (Rayner, 1998). To avoid strong effects of long fixations on a piece of evidence, and
to reduce the skew of the distribution, we used the natural logarithm of FT, which was computed for each ROI (see
Figure 1) at the participant by task level. Using mixed effects linear models, we investigate the extent to which ln(FT)
is influenced by the following CE factors:
• The LEFT parameter (β1) captures the systematic effect of an ROI belonging to the left alternative compared to the
right. Such an effect would be consistent with a “left‐to‐right” reading bias where participants pay more attention to
information presented on the left (Durgin, Doyle, & Egan, 2008; Guo, Meints, Hall, Hall, & Mills, 2009; Rayner, 1978,
1998). Leftward biases are also found in other tasks, including digit comparison (Loetscher Q8et al., 2008), picture
scanning and line bisection (Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010), visual search (Durgin et al.,
2008), reading Chinese characters, and face perception (Butler et al., 2005; Everdell, Marsh, Yurick, Munhall, &
Par, 2007 Q9; van Belle, 2010). We expect participants to spend more time looking at the left options (H1: β1 > 0).
• Two POSITION parameters capture the effects of the attributes position within the choice tasks. β2 and β3 measure
respectively the effect of being top located (1st or 2nd position) and bottom located (6th or 7th position) versus being
middle located (i.e., 3rd, 4th, or 5th position). This would also be consistent with typical reading patterns and has
been found in other domains such as visual search (Durgin et al., 2008). Within the CE literature, there is evidence
of ordering effects on estimated preferences (Kjær, Bech, Gyrd‐Hansen, & Hart‐Hansen, 2006; Scott & Vick, 1999).
Thus, first and last consulted pieces of information may receive a visual attention bonus‐malus. We expect FTs to
differ for the top (H2[a]: β2 ≠ 0) and bottom located attributes (H2[b]: β3 ≠ 0).
• The two LEVEL parameters (β4 and β5) capture the effects of attributes' value, either BEST or WORST, on visual atten-
tion. An attribute is classified as BEST when it is set at its most desirable level (e.g., lowest price) and WORST when set
at least desirable level (e.g., highest price; Table 1). We expect extreme information, either BEST or WORST, to be more
psychologically salient (compared to INTERMEDIATE), thus attracting more attention (H3[a]: β4 > 0; H3[b]: β5 > 0). In
line with loss aversion, participants are expected to be more sensitive to negatively framed information (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). We therefore expect participants to be more attentive to WORST than BEST information
(H3[c]: β4 < β5). Our classification of attributes' levels as BEST, INTERMEDIATE, or WORST is based on results from
Ryan et al. (2015), which administered the same CE questionnaire to a representative sample of the U.K. population.
• Two TRIAL parameters (β6 and β7) capture the effect of task sequence (i.e., position of the choice tasks within the
questionnaire). Previous studies have reported the effects of task ordering on the consistency of respondents' choices
(Bateman, Diane, George Hutchinson, & Matthews, 2008; Day et al., 2012; Mantonakis, Rodero, Lesschaeve, &
Hastie, 2009), suggesting learning and fatigue effects. We assume that as respondents progress through the choice
tasks, they become more efficient in their information search, reducing FTs on the ROI (H4[a]: β6 < 0). However, this
effect is expected to become marginally smaller over the sequence of tasks (H4[b]: β7 > 0).
• The DIFFICULTY parameter (β8) captures the impact of choice difficulty. Shugan (1980) argues that difficulty is
inversely related to perceptual similarity—highly different options are more difficult. As alternatives become less
similar, the variance in the values on the attributes across alternatives increases. This can be captured by the
dispersion of the standard deviation (DSD) among attribute levels across alternatives (DeShazo & Fermo,
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2002).1 A priori, it is hypothesised that as DSD increases, choice sets become less similar, and participants spend
more time processing the multi‐attribute information (H5: β8 > 0).
• The EXPERIMENT parameter (β9) captures the effect of reversing the order of attributes and two choice options (over
and above LEFT and POSITION). Using brain imaging, Karmarkar, Shiv, and Knutson (2015) found that different
orderings of product features was associated with different decision rules/objectives; that is, when the product price
was presented first, participants were more likely to focus on whether the product was worth its price. We expect FTs
to significantly differ across experiments (H6: β9 ≠ 0).
We thus estimate Q10:
ln FTntrð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1LEFTntr þ β2:3POSITIONntr þ β4:5LEVELntr þ β6:7TRIALntrþ
β8DIFFICULTYntr þ β9EXPERIMENTntr þ ωn þ εntr;
(1)
where (FTntr) indicates the FT on ROI (r) by respondent (n) at task (t). The errors (ω and ε) are assumed to be multivar-
iate normally distributed and uncorrelated. Given that we use ln(FT) as the dependent variable, estimates can be
interpreted as the % change in the FT by taking their exponent, that is, exp(β).
Results are presented in Table T22. Attributes of the left option were fixated on average +16% longer than those of the
right option, suggesting a left‐to‐right bias in visual attention, in agreement with studies in other domains (see above).
Part of this bias may be the result of the reading direction (left‐to‐right) in our participants, and an interesting future
direction would therefore be to study whether this bias is reversed when using a language with right‐to‐left reading
direction (e.g., Arabic, Farsi, Hebrew, and Urdu). This visual bias may explain why CEs often find a significant constant
term in generic choices. This finding suggests that randomising the order of the alternatives within the choice tasks may
improve the quality of CE data.
The first two attributes were looked at longer than the middle positioned attributes (+30%), whereas the bottom
located attributes were looked at less (−16%). These effects indicate a top‐to‐bottom visual bias when processing
vertically presented (multi‐attribute) information. Our finding suggests that observed top‐to‐bottom biases in CE may
have their origin in stronger visual attention to attributes shown at the top. This suggests that it is important to
randomise the order of attributes. We suggest that this randomization is best done at the participant level (i.e., the order
1The entropy measure is often used to capture task difficulty in CEs, describing the similarity of alternatives. Entropy is typically constructed using par-
ticipant responses, creating an endogeneity problem; that is, entropy is a function of the probability of selecting each of the available alternatives and
thus may be a consequence of fixation time (rather than vice versa). We thank the reviewer for this comment and thus use the DSD measure (which
does not rely on respondent preferences). Appendix S1 compares the results using entropy and DSD measures; the main results remain unchanged.
TABLE 2 Mixed effects regression of ln(fixation times)
MLE SE p
1. Model parameters
Constant 6.204 0.063 <.001
LEFT 0.146 0.015 <.001
POSITION (top) 0.259 0.018 <.001
POSITION (bottom) −0.170 0.019 <.001
LEVEL (best) 0.090 0.021 <.001
LEVEL (worst) −0.037 0.017 .026
TRIAL −0.039 0.009 <.001
TRIAL × TRIAL 0.002 0.001 <.001
DIFFICULTY (DSD) 0.336 0.091 <.001
EXPERIMENT 0.182 0.071 .010
Individual errors 0.264 — —
Observation errors 0.680 — —
2. Model statistics
# Observations 8,421
# Parameters 11
Log‐likelihood 8,816.8
DSD = dispersion of standard deviation; MLE = maximum likelihood estimate..
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of the attributes would differ across participants but remains the same for all tasks faced by the same participant),
because otherwise, participants have to adopt to a new order of attributes on every single choice.
Negatively (WORST) framed attributes were less looked at (−4%), whereas positively (BEST) framed attributes were
associated with longer FTs (+9%). The finding suggests that respondents give relatively more consideration to attributes
with positive outcomes, consistent with Dawes' rule (Dawes Q11, 1979), where alternatives with the highest number of
positive aspects are chosen more often. Note that this finding is inconsistent with loss aversion, which predicted that
negatively framed attributes would be fixated for longer. A possible reason for failing to find evidence of loss aversion
may be that we dealt with hypothetical (non‐consequential) choices, and it would therefore be interesting to determine
whether the same result is obtained for actual choices (e.g., people making decisions in a doctor's surgery). Alternatively,
future studies could examine whether one of the approaches to mitigate such hypothetical bias (e.g., cheap talk script
and oath protocol; Carlsson Q12et al., 2005; Jacquemet Q13et al., 2013; Özdemir Qet al., 2009) influences the bias towards
positively framed attributes that we found here.
Both TRIAL variables had a significant effect on FT. The significant and negative trial number effect indicates that as
participants progress through the sequence of tasks, they spend less time looking at the different ROIs (first‐to‐last bias).
The quadratic effect indicates that the marginal change in FT decreases over time. This result suggests that first observed
choices could be contaminated by participants adjusting to the task, and respondents may change their choice
behaviour(s) during the study. Such an interpretation would agree with findings showing significantly longer responses
time for the first task (Borjesson Q15& Fosgerau, 2015). The present results, because we used two warm‐up trials, suggest
that longer FTs last beyond the first task. It is therefore important to randomise the order of choices across participants
so that in the average data, such effects can be minimised.
The DIFFICULTY (DSD) parameter describes a positive relationship between task difficulty and visual attention.
Participants spend more time fixating attributes when facing difficult choice tasks. This result is important for the design
of CEs. While on the one hand, one would like to maximise the information gained from each trial by making the choice
tasks more challenging, it could, on the other hand, wear out participants. This is in line with suggestions that statistical
efficiency (i.e., information gained from each choice) is negatively correlated with the respondents' efficiency (i.e., the
ability of participants to make informed decisions; Flynn, Bilger, Malhotra, & Finkelstein, 2016; Viney, Savage, &
Louviere, 2005). Our study suggests that although increased statistical efficiency could wear participants out, it seems
to improve respondents' attention, possibly leading to more informed decisions. The question arises to when this positive
benefit on attention breaks down (e.g., after how many trials), which could be an interesting topic for future research.
The EXPERIMENT variable significantly contributed to the prediction of the FTs. This means that the ordering of the
attributes influenced FTs beyond the effects of the attributes being left or right, or top or bottom. This suggests that
besides considering what attributes to include (e.g., Coast Q16et al., 2012), the design of CEs should also consider in what
order the attributes are presented, particularly when computerised CEs are employed. When randomising is not an
option (e.g., for pen‐and‐paper surveys), a second best solution may be to define “experientially meaningful
configurations” (Hensher Q17& Truong, 1985), which uses an ordering of attributes that is consistent with different steps
in the process involved (e.g., for a medical appointment, the delay to get an appointment, the distance to travel, the
waiting time, the length of consultation, and out‐of‐pocket expense).
4 | DETERMINANTS OF FIXATION TRANSITIONS
So far, we have only considered how long people look at attributes. This, however, discounts temporal information on
the order in which attributes are processed. There are indications that the order of processing is important for deci-
sion‐making. For example, Armel et al. (2008) showed that first fixated product (option) was more likely to be selected
Q18ceteris paribus. Likewise, participants are more likely to choose the option they look at last (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, &
Scheier, 2003). To analyse order effects, we here examine transitions (i.e., eye movements between ROI) as a function of
time in the trials (percentage of the trials). We define four transition categories: option‐wise (vertical reading), where
participants move their eyes across ROI belonging to the same option (e.g., TIME [A]→ COST [A]); attribute‐wise (hor-
izontal reading), where participants compare options on an attribute‐by‐attribute basis (e.g., COST [A] → COST [B]);
refixations, where participants consecutively fixate on the same ROI (e.g., COST [A] → COST [A]); and hybrid, where
participants move their eyes across ROI belonging to different options (e.g., TIME [A]→ COST [B]). If people first form
an overall impression of each choice option and then compare these overall impressions, we expect more option‐wise
transitions. If they compare the attributes of the two choice options directly, we expect more attribute‐wise transitions.
6 RYAN ET AL.1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
Our dataset initially included 34,023 transitions. Those corresponding to a transition from the descriptive column (i.
e., ROI 1 to 8 in Figure 1) were excluded, leaving 29,641 (87.1%) transitions: 13,548 (45.7%) refixations; 8,645 (29.2%)
option‐wise; 4,898 (16.5%) attribute‐wise; and 2,550 (8.6%) hybrid. (Detailed information about transitions is provided
in Appendix S2.) Figure F22 shows the time course of transitions across choices, clustered into 10 time bins for each trial
(i.e., beginning of the information processing period [0–10%]; …; end of information processing period [90–100%]). Visual
information processing mainly consists of refixations and option‐wise transitions: Participants initially (i.e., first three
time bins) process the multi‐attribute information mainly with refixations before exploring the content of each option
separately (i.e., option‐wise transitions).
We investigate transitions as a function of three task‐related variables: TRIAL (Task order); Dispersion of Standard
deviation (DSD; Task difficulty); and EXPERIMENT (Experiment 1 or 2). As the dependent measure, we use the search
measure (SM) index (Böckenholt & Hynan, 1994), which measures the degree to which information is processed
vertically or horizontally (see Q19Appendix S2 for more details about the SM measure). SM is computed as
SM ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
TR
p JK
TR
TRJ−TRKð Þ− K− Jð Þ
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
J2 K−1ð Þ þ K2 J−1ð Þ
p ; (2)
where J corresponds to the number of choice options (J = 2), K the number of attributes (K = 7), TR the total number of
transitions, TRK the number of attribute‐wise transition, and TRJ the number of option‐wise transitions. The SM
measure is zero for random search behaviour,2 negative for more attribute‐wise (horizontal) transitions, and positive
for more option‐wise (vertical) transitions. We compute the SM index for each participant (n) and choice task (t). The
square root of the absolute value of the SM index for each participant (n) and choice task (t) was then modelled in a
mixed effects linear regression model:
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
SMntj j
p
¼ β0 þ β1TRIALnt þ β2TRIAL2nt þ β3DSDnt þ β4EXPERIMENTnt þ ωn þ εnt; (3)
where ω measures between‐subjects variance, accounting for panel nature of the data. Modelling the absolute value of
SM index allows investigation into deviations from random information processing (i.e., SM = 0).
On the basis of the theory by DeShazo and Fermo (2002) that participants to a CE allocate their limited attention in a
rationally adaptive manner, we predict that over the course of the experiment, when fatigue sets in, participants' choices
FIGURE 2 Evolution of information processing strategies (IPS) over (fixation) time [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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2SM does not evaluate the quality of information processing but only how the information is being visually processed. Thus, a “random search” (SM = 0)
does not necessarily imply poor decision‐making.
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become more random (i.e., the absolute value of SM will reduce). For task difficulty, fixation patterns could become
more structured (i.e., the absolute value of SM increases). The order of the attributes and choice options (EXPERIMENT)
may also influence the absolute value of SM, but the direction of the effect is more difficult to predict.
For the entire dataset, a negative value for SM is obtained in 621 (89.2%) cases, indicating attribute‐wise (horizontal)
information processing. Regression results, shown in Table T33, confirm our predictions. The direction of eye movements
becomes more random over the course of the experiment (negative effect of TRIAL) but more structured for more difficult
choices (positive effect of DSD) andmore structured when COST is presented at the top (positive effect of EXPERIMENT).
5 | VISUAL ATTENTION AND CHOICE BEHAVIOUR
Finally, we examine how transitions (as measured by the SM variable) are linked to choice. Previous studies have shown
that ANA (or more generally attributes attention) is linked to eye movements during the choice (Balcombe et al., 2015;
Krucien et al., 2017; Spinks & Mortimer, 2015). By examining how transitions are linked to choices, we can test the
prediction of random regret minimisation (RRM; Boeri et al., 2013; Chorus Q20et al., 2008; Chorus Q21, 2010; Chorus Q, 2012;
de Bekker‐Grob & Chorus, 2013) that multi‐attribute information is processed on an attribute basis. In comparison,
random utility maximisation (RUM) does not impose a particular type of information processing. Thus, Q24
RUM
UTILITYntA ¼ ΣkβkXntAkð Þ þ εntA; (4)
UTILITYntB ¼ ΣkβkXntBkð Þ þ εntB; (5)
P Ynt ¼ Að Þ ¼ P UntA>UntBð Þ ¼ P VntA−VntB>εntB−εntAð Þ; (6)
DIFFERENCEUTILITYnt ¼ Σkβk XntAk−XntBkð Þð Þ þ εnt; (7)
RRM
REGRETntA ¼ Σk ln 1þ exp βk XntB kð Þ−XntA kð Þ
    α þ εntA; (8)
REGRETntB ¼ Σk ln 1þ exp βk XntA kð Þ−XntB kð Þ
    α þ εntB; (9)
where n denotes the respondents, t the choice tasks, k the attributes, and X the value of the attributes. The (β) parameters
represent preferences for attributes. The (ε) errors are assumed to be independently and identically distributed as type I
extreme value leading to the multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1974; Train, 2009).
TABLE 3 Mixed effects regression of SM index
MLE SE p
1. Model parameters
Constant 1.501 0.089 <.001
TRIAL −0.038 0.017 .026
TRIAL × TRIAL 0.001 0.001 .652
DIFFICULTY (DSD) 0.020 0.165 .905
EXPERIMENT 0.381 0.093 <.001
Individual error 0.338 — —
Observation error 0.356 — —
2. Model statistics
# Observations 696
# Parameters 6
Log‐likelihood 352.3
SM = search measure; MLE = maximum likelihood estimate.
8 RYAN ET AL.1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
Because very few opt‐out responses were given,3 we only consider responses for either choice A or B, meaning that
the REGRET function (Equations 8 and 9) collapses into the standard UTILITY function (Equations 4 and 5) when α = 1.
We investigate the impact of visual attention on participants' choices by specifying the α parameter as a function of the
SM index:
α ¼ exp α1SMþnt þ α2SMþ2nt þ α3SM−nt þ α4SM−2nt
	 

; (10)
where SM+ and SM− correspond to the positive and negative portions of the SM index, respectively. A negative SM (SM
−) indicates a tendency to process information on an attribute basis, whereas a positive SM (SM+) corresponds to a
vertical information processing. We expect α1 to be non‐significant (H1: α1 = 0), because vertical information processing
makes RUM and RRM more alike (α1 ≈ 0 → α ≈ 1). We expect α3 to be significant (H2: α3 ≠ 0) as attribute‐wise
information processing would be better captured by RRM than RUM.
The results are presented in Table T44. The RRM model provides a better account of participants' choices, as indicated
by the lower log‐likelihood (LL) value (LLRRM = 343.7 vs. LLRUM = 346.1). However, this improvement does not reach
significance at 5% level (LR test: Deviance = 4.88; Q25p = .3). As expected, SM− has a significant and negative effect,
indicating that when information processing became more attribute‐wise, the RUM and RRM provide a different
account of participants' choices.
6 | DISCUSSION
In the present work, we show that eye tracking can aid the understanding of information processing strategies in multi‐
attribute choice. Our results have important implications for the design and modelling of CEs, thus improving the
validity of resulting policy recommendations. We found a range of visual biases that agree with earlier reported choice
biases, including a left‐to‐right, top‐to‐bottom, and first‐to‐last. Our work suggests that many of these biases originate in
the deployment of visual attention during a CE. Importantly, these biases indicate that CE data can be substantially
improved by randomising the order of alternatives, attributes, and choice trials. Although pen‐and‐paper randomisation
may be complicated (although not impossible on a participant by participant basis), an increased reliance on
computerised CEs (e.g., presented on a computer tablet or online via a web browser) will facilitate such randomisation.
Our analyses also demonstrate effects of task factors, including whether attributes are defined as best or worse, the level
3The initial sample included 58 participants who provided 696 observations. The opt‐out option was selected in only 48 (6.9%) cases. For 53 (91.4%)
participants, the share of opt‐out choices was below 25% (i.e., less than three choices). The highest proportion of opt‐out choices (i.e., 58.3%) was
attained by two (3.4%) participants. After removing opt‐out choices, 648 (93.1%) observations remained.
TABLE 4 MNL modelling of discrete choices with RUM and RRM approaches
RUM RRM
MLE SE p MLE SE p
1. Model parameters
PROGRAMME 0.624 0.234 .008 0.606 0.232 .009
GOAL 0.885 0.183 <.001 0.891 0.181 <.001
WEIGHT 0.490 0.155 .002 0.526 0.156 <.001
DIABETES 0.024 0.004 <.001 0.024 0.004 <.001
HBP 0.011 0.003 <.001 0.011 0.003 <.001
TIME −0.015 0.002 <.001 −0.015 0.002 <.001
COST −0.029 0.011 .009 −0.028 0.011 .011
SM+ (α1) — — — 0.360 0.331 .277
SM+ (α2) — — — −0.115 0.190 .547
SM− (α3) — — — −0.135 0.069 .049
SM− (α4) — — — −0.016 0.011 .129
2. Model statistics
# Observations 648 648
# Parameters 7 11
Log‐likelihood 346.1 343.7
MLE = maximum likelihood estimate; MNL = multinomial logit; RRM = random regret minimisation; RUM = random utility maximisation.
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of complexity of the choice task, and ordering of attributes. Our data also showed that the RRM model outperformed the
RUM model in linking eye movements with respondents' choice behaviour, although the exact link between eye
movements and choice behaviour needs to be established in future research.
Because CEs contain words (besides numerical information), this raises the question to what extent factors that
influence reading also influence eye movements when completing a CE. For reading, it is known that fixation durations
are longer for less frequent (familiar) words, less predictable words, and for words with multiple meanings (Rayner,
1998). The extent to which these factors influence FTs during CEs is unclear. In comparison to normal text, text in
CEs is repeated often, which increases the predictability of the words. It is therefore likely that participants do not read
all of the words of boxes containing longer text (the resolution of the eye‐tracker used may not suffice to answer this
question with sufficient confidence). Furthermore, we included two warm‐up trials, which is expected to increase
predictability further. In all, we therefore do not expect strong effects of word properties on processing a CE. A second
possible factor involves reading ability of our participants. Although we did not test explicitly for this, our participant
groups were uniform on a broad range of other factors (all current or former students). Moreover, most of the effects
tested in our study involved within subjects comparisons (the only exception being the EXPERIMENT factor), which
are less likely to be influenced by individual differences.
There are a few possible limitations to our study. First, the act of eye tracking may influence visual attention. This, how-
ever, is unlikely to influence the present results. Although studies in social attention suggest that awareness of the recording
of eye movements influences the direction of visual attention (Risko Q26&Kingstone, 2011), these results are for objects that are
socially less acceptable to be gazed at (e.g., a swimsuit calendar on the wall). No eye‐tracker bias is found for neutral objects.
Second, and perhaps more notable, our eye‐tracker used a chin‐and‐forehead rest. The use of such equipment is not
uncommon in eye‐tracking studies, particularly those requiring high spatial accuracy of the recordings (as in studies of
reading; Rayner, 1978, 1998). The restriction of head movements, however, may have reduced the frequency of looking
away from the text. Examining the effects of head restriction would be an interesting venue for future research,
particularly now that mobile eye‐tracking technology is becoming more mainstream and more accurate.
Third, our sample, psychology students, was not representative of the U.K. population. The use of a student sample is in
line with many studies in consumer research and social psychology (Henry Q27, 2008), mostly because they are easier to recruit
for lab‐based studies. There are indications that students may not be representative of the general population, as they tend to
have stronger cognitive skills and showmore compliant behaviour (Peterson Q28&Merunka, 2014). Thus, the generalisability of
our findings is limited. However, although choices may differ for a different population, there are no clear reasons to believe
that the link between visual attention and choices and visual biases will depend on the population studied. With the
development of more portable eye‐tracking equipment (e.g., EyeTribe, Eyelink Portable Duo, SMI Red250 Portable, Tobii
X2‐60, Tobii 2 Glasses, SMI Glasses, and Positive Science eye‐tracker), future research should aim to move the work to a
broader population‐based sample and move from the laboratory into clinical and community settings.
Finally, we note that in our multivariate analysis of FTs, we investigated whether “better” attributes attract more
attention (and conversely “worse” attribute less attention). Although for the quantitative attributes (e.g., reduction of
risk of hypertension), it is clear what defined “better,” we had to base our assumptions regarding best and worst levels
on responses to the original CE, generated from the general population. Whether these extend to our student population
needs to be addressed in future research.
7 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our study shows how eye tracking provides insight into how respondents complete CEs, suggesting a number of biases
and context‐related decision strategies. As well as providing guidance to CE practitioners on the design and analysis of
CE data, we hope our paper stimulates discussion of the use of eye tracking in applied economic research. As Lahey and
Oxley (2016) commented, research with an eye‐tracker is limited only by our imagination.
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